This article in the San Francisco Chronicle caught my eye for several reasons. It details a “protest” initiated by popular youth leader Ron Luce in San Francisco against “the virtue terrorism” of popular culture. It was intended to draw evangelical students together for concerts and speeches designed to reinforce a biblical worldview of morality.
Sounds pretty good to me. I don’t exactly agree with Luce’s militant tone and his combative pitch, but it seems good to reinforce a movement that is counter-cultural in the ways described in the article. You can read about Luce’s program at its website.
It seems to me that the more the classical virtues are encouraged in teens, the better culture will be. But not everyone sees it that way. In fact, S.F. greeted the “protesters” with its own counter protest. And the invectives flew with alacrity. One city official called the evangelical teens a “fascist mega-pep rally.” From the article:
Assemblyman Mark Leno, D-San Francisco,…told counterprotesters at City Hall on Friday that while such fundamentalists may be small in number, "they're loud, they're obnoxious, they're disgusting, and they should get out of San Francisco."
In an example of “fueling the fire,” this excerpt contains militant language from Luce and a backhanded reply by the article’s author:
"Are you ready to go to battle for your generation?" he asked, and the young people roared "yes!" and some waved triangular red flags flown from long, medieval-looking poles.
They were not just “poles” or “sticks,” they were medieval-looking.
What I want to reflect on, though, is exactly how corrupting immorality can be. I am not arguing that all the San Franciscoites quoted in the piece are overly evil, just that they subscribe to a worldview that is licentious, and extremely short on virtue. (Contemporary tolerance, by the way, is not a virtue.)
It is amazing to me that students who are striving to be good spouses, good students, good children, and good citizens are chastised as fascists. The reason this happens, I believe, is that when biblical morality is abandoned it is not long before vice becomes virtue and virtue becomes vice. This is a town that revels in public pornographic displays of sexuality and erupts in a tizzy of faux righteousness when they are called into question. Yet, when kids get together to not have sex or to not get high, they call it evil. To those from the worldview exemplified by many in S.F., the meanings of “virtue” and “vice” are completely and perfectly reversed.
In the kind of dizzyingly hypocritical comment that is becoming all too common these days, the S.F. Board of Supervisors acted:
Earlier this week, the Board of Supervisors passed a resolution condemning the "act of provocation" by what it termed an "anti-gay," "anti-choice" organization that aimed to "negatively influence the politics of America's most tolerant and progressive city."
In this statement, and so many like it, tolerance is an incredibly thin and narrow view of the world. And, darn it, if you disagree with it, don’t expect an ounce of tolerance.
Bravo to those students. And may they know that they are not only on the side of history, common sense, and good reason, but of the Creator of the universe as well.
Monday, March 27, 2006
Postmoderns, Christians, and Worldviews
I am in the middle of reading David Well’s final book in his wonderful four-book series, Above All Earthly Pow’rs: Christ In A Postmodern World. The book has a lot to commend about it, and though I am only just over half-way through, I thought a couple of things deserved comment.
At the top of the list is his dismay at certain circles in the church who apparently are trying to assimilate postmodernism instead of confronting it. In a phrase interesting to those familiar with Niebuhr’s categories of cultural engagement, Wells states, “Yet confrontation is always at the heart of the relation between Christ and culture because that relation is one of light and its relation to darkness, truth to false belief, and holiness to what is fallen.” (p. 164) That strikes me as right. As he goes on to argue, instead of figuring our how to be relevant (in his words to “reach” our culture by becoming like it), we should be confronting postmodern culture on a worldview level.
In accord with what I have mentioned before, Wells argues in the same chapter that in spite of all its verbal wrangling to the contrary, Postmodernism is a worldview and deserves to be analyzed and critiqued as such. A very long time ago I posted that Postmodernism contains in it the seeds of the destruction of the church if we become too Postmodern. Wells agrees: “This casual embrace of what is postmodern has increasingly lead to an embrace of its spiritual yearning [one argument in the book is that it is individual spiritualism disconnected from truth and religion] without noticing that this embrace carries with it the seeds of destruction for evangelical faith.” (p. 158) His specific examples of such embrace include Middleton, Walsh, and McLaren. (A poster once remarked that if only I read Walsh I would understand how accurate the postmodern take on epistemology is. For the record, I have read Walsh and that is why I no longer read much of Walsh.)
One of Well’s takes on these seeds of destruction is a take on the Greek words for love, Agape and Eros. Christian, God-like love is Agape. It begins with God reaching down to sinful humans and their response is enabled by His grace and revelation. We engage a Truth-something bigger than ourselves, universal, transcultural, and absolute. Eros love is the only kind of love left when we have become postmodern. Because there is nothing we can grasp outside of our selves, our love begins in us, looks like us, is in accord with what we want to believe, and ends with ourselves. Given the epistemological and metaphysical nihilism inherent in Postmodernism, there is no Other with which to engage. We are all we have access to and all we really need to have access to.
At the top of the list is his dismay at certain circles in the church who apparently are trying to assimilate postmodernism instead of confronting it. In a phrase interesting to those familiar with Niebuhr’s categories of cultural engagement, Wells states, “Yet confrontation is always at the heart of the relation between Christ and culture because that relation is one of light and its relation to darkness, truth to false belief, and holiness to what is fallen.” (p. 164) That strikes me as right. As he goes on to argue, instead of figuring our how to be relevant (in his words to “reach” our culture by becoming like it), we should be confronting postmodern culture on a worldview level.
In accord with what I have mentioned before, Wells argues in the same chapter that in spite of all its verbal wrangling to the contrary, Postmodernism is a worldview and deserves to be analyzed and critiqued as such. A very long time ago I posted that Postmodernism contains in it the seeds of the destruction of the church if we become too Postmodern. Wells agrees: “This casual embrace of what is postmodern has increasingly lead to an embrace of its spiritual yearning [one argument in the book is that it is individual spiritualism disconnected from truth and religion] without noticing that this embrace carries with it the seeds of destruction for evangelical faith.” (p. 158) His specific examples of such embrace include Middleton, Walsh, and McLaren. (A poster once remarked that if only I read Walsh I would understand how accurate the postmodern take on epistemology is. For the record, I have read Walsh and that is why I no longer read much of Walsh.)
One of Well’s takes on these seeds of destruction is a take on the Greek words for love, Agape and Eros. Christian, God-like love is Agape. It begins with God reaching down to sinful humans and their response is enabled by His grace and revelation. We engage a Truth-something bigger than ourselves, universal, transcultural, and absolute. Eros love is the only kind of love left when we have become postmodern. Because there is nothing we can grasp outside of our selves, our love begins in us, looks like us, is in accord with what we want to believe, and ends with ourselves. Given the epistemological and metaphysical nihilism inherent in Postmodernism, there is no Other with which to engage. We are all we have access to and all we really need to have access to.
Sunday, March 26, 2006
Are All Redemption Stories The Same?
I heard a fellow make an interesting argument on the radio this week regarding Islam and the rest of the religions of the world. His argument belied two very deep misunderstandings and quite a bit of the bad reasoning so prevalent in our culture today. His primary argument was that Islam should not be considered a religion because it did not have a theory of redemption (I must admit I am impressed he used the word “redemption”). His support was that all the other major religions of the world have a theory of redemption that is peaceful, and therefore religious. Islam, according to him, was violent and therefore did not have a theory of redemption and was then not a religion.
First, I think it could be argued that Islam most certainly does have a theory of redemption that is caught up in works that please Allah. And in certain important ways, the path of redemption is a violent one. “Convert or Die,” contrary to popular opinion today, was perfected by the Muslims well before the Middle Ages, and how often are we told that one of the reasons there are so many suicide bombers is their promised reward beyond death? The fact that one path of redemption is violent does not exclude Islam from the category of “religion.”
The next problem was implicit in the fellow’s argument. It was the assertion that the rest of the religions of the world were basically the same because their theories of redemption were basically the same. That “sameness” to him was the peaceful nature of each theory. That is a little like arguing that all political theories are the same because they are political-or that all people are basically the same person because most of them have two eyes.
The peacefulness or lack thereof in a religion’s redemption story is not a significant factor in determining their identities. Christianity argues for a redemption process that begins with God speaking, moves to sinful humans responding in His grace, and finishes with God’s act of sacrifice securing resurrection. Buddhist redemption begins with the individual deep in contemplation and meditation, and ends with a recycling of the soul back into this material world. The two theories are completely incoherent with each other. Either one is true and the other is false, or both are false. It cannot be the case that both are true.
First, I think it could be argued that Islam most certainly does have a theory of redemption that is caught up in works that please Allah. And in certain important ways, the path of redemption is a violent one. “Convert or Die,” contrary to popular opinion today, was perfected by the Muslims well before the Middle Ages, and how often are we told that one of the reasons there are so many suicide bombers is their promised reward beyond death? The fact that one path of redemption is violent does not exclude Islam from the category of “religion.”
The next problem was implicit in the fellow’s argument. It was the assertion that the rest of the religions of the world were basically the same because their theories of redemption were basically the same. That “sameness” to him was the peaceful nature of each theory. That is a little like arguing that all political theories are the same because they are political-or that all people are basically the same person because most of them have two eyes.
The peacefulness or lack thereof in a religion’s redemption story is not a significant factor in determining their identities. Christianity argues for a redemption process that begins with God speaking, moves to sinful humans responding in His grace, and finishes with God’s act of sacrifice securing resurrection. Buddhist redemption begins with the individual deep in contemplation and meditation, and ends with a recycling of the soul back into this material world. The two theories are completely incoherent with each other. Either one is true and the other is false, or both are false. It cannot be the case that both are true.
Saturday, March 25, 2006
ADHD Worship
I have encountered and classified a new form of worship. I am calling it ADHD Worship. It is classified by the incessant movement of people who not only break out into song from time to time, but use worship time to meet and greet friends, play at dancing together during the faster songs, and nearly never pay attention to the song or the worship leaders. And of course, during the choruses of fast songs, you are required to jump up and down (the white man’s version of Gospel “creative movement”).
Now as many of you know I grew up in a Pentecostal tradition, and still am part of a worship tradition that is known for its penchant to move from time to time in ways uncomfortable for most Presbyterians. I have seen rowdy crowds of worshipers, but that is not what I am talking about.
It is said that ADHD kids are OK learning while they are moving around. So here we have a setting in which apparently the best way to engage God is to become mobile, social, and unfocused. People often complain that evangelical worship is susceptible to being a concert-well, this is a concert. In fact, most intimate concert setting I have been in have shown more decorum and respect than this experience did.
It strikes me that for all our evangelical experimenting with worship styles, this has to be one of the lowest forms on the food chain. Take traditional church hymnody, remove 80% of the theology, simplify the melody and chord structure, never stress reverence and awe, encourage an incredibly privatized form of experience, open the aisles for “meet-and-greets,” and viola you have ADHD worship.
I am interested in the sensibilities this creates in people, especially young people. Will they have the capacity to encounter God in worship in reverence and respect? Will they learn that encountering God is always a matter of emotional highs-even if they have to manufacture it? Will they deepen their grasp of doctrine or will they develop only a devotional relationship with God?
What happened to God’s still, small voice? Don’t we need to be quiet, focused, and attentive to hear that?
Now as many of you know I grew up in a Pentecostal tradition, and still am part of a worship tradition that is known for its penchant to move from time to time in ways uncomfortable for most Presbyterians. I have seen rowdy crowds of worshipers, but that is not what I am talking about.
It is said that ADHD kids are OK learning while they are moving around. So here we have a setting in which apparently the best way to engage God is to become mobile, social, and unfocused. People often complain that evangelical worship is susceptible to being a concert-well, this is a concert. In fact, most intimate concert setting I have been in have shown more decorum and respect than this experience did.
It strikes me that for all our evangelical experimenting with worship styles, this has to be one of the lowest forms on the food chain. Take traditional church hymnody, remove 80% of the theology, simplify the melody and chord structure, never stress reverence and awe, encourage an incredibly privatized form of experience, open the aisles for “meet-and-greets,” and viola you have ADHD worship.
I am interested in the sensibilities this creates in people, especially young people. Will they have the capacity to encounter God in worship in reverence and respect? Will they learn that encountering God is always a matter of emotional highs-even if they have to manufacture it? Will they deepen their grasp of doctrine or will they develop only a devotional relationship with God?
What happened to God’s still, small voice? Don’t we need to be quiet, focused, and attentive to hear that?
Saturday, March 18, 2006
Jeremiah on Pastoral Plagiarism
I apologize again for the long time between posts. It has been a busy few weeks. But fortunately for me, I ran across this passage in Jeremiah this afternoon.
I have posted before on the problem of pastoral plagiarism, and how pervasive it has become. With the volume of readily available sermons through tapes, radio and the internet, it is abundantly easy for a minister to copy sermons, if not point for point and joke for joke, take enough of the substance to actually plagiarize. This passage from Jeremiah 23:30-31 makes my point clear. I quote from The Message:
30"I've had it with the "prophets' who get all their sermons secondhand from each other. 31Yes, I've had it with them. They make up stuff and then pretend it's a real sermon.
In the larger context, God complains the false teachers/prophets are claiming to speak for Him when they haven’t even spent time with Him or in His Word (v. 18). So the reason the “prophets” were not giving “original material” is because they failed to pay attention to God.
Do too many of our pastors today commit the same mistake for maybe the same reason? Are some of them too busy being corporate executives and marketers to be listeners of God?
I know the issue of plagiarizing material on a book that has been spoken on billions of times is tricky, but surely we can call a spade a spade. If a pastor, on a regular basis, does not do the work of trying to connect their congregation to God for this week, then something may be amiss.
I have posted before on the problem of pastoral plagiarism, and how pervasive it has become. With the volume of readily available sermons through tapes, radio and the internet, it is abundantly easy for a minister to copy sermons, if not point for point and joke for joke, take enough of the substance to actually plagiarize. This passage from Jeremiah 23:30-31 makes my point clear. I quote from The Message:
30"I've had it with the "prophets' who get all their sermons secondhand from each other. 31Yes, I've had it with them. They make up stuff and then pretend it's a real sermon.
In the larger context, God complains the false teachers/prophets are claiming to speak for Him when they haven’t even spent time with Him or in His Word (v. 18). So the reason the “prophets” were not giving “original material” is because they failed to pay attention to God.
Do too many of our pastors today commit the same mistake for maybe the same reason? Are some of them too busy being corporate executives and marketers to be listeners of God?
I know the issue of plagiarizing material on a book that has been spoken on billions of times is tricky, but surely we can call a spade a spade. If a pastor, on a regular basis, does not do the work of trying to connect their congregation to God for this week, then something may be amiss.
Friday, February 24, 2006
Notre Dame and Academic Freedom
A friend of mine attends Notre Dame and recently sent a few of us this link to a story in the NY Times about some of the recent academic freedom/freedom of expression issues in which the campus is embroiled. One of the sparks to this controversy is t-shirts (shown in a photo in the story) which read, “Gay? Fine By Me.” I must say, given the sense of humor in our circle of friends, we have a lot of fun playing with that t-shirt idea. We have discussed the relative merits of t-shirts that read, “Necrophile? Fine by me?” or the oddly insignificant, “Steve? Fine By Me.” Anyway, you get the idea.
The article does a good job of presenting the lay of the land and some of the special issues involved with being a major University and religiously committed on a significant level at the same time. Does academic freedom/freedom of speech mean anything ought to be honestly presented? Does a Catholic or religious commitment mean that there are other priorities higher up the food chain than “freedom” of academic expression? Can or should some expressions be squelched in the service of these higher priorities?
I was pondering Aristotle and virtue this morning. (That sentence makes me sound smarter than I really am.) But I believe Aristotle would be in favor of excluding some forms of expression from education. If it did not serve the flourishing of the human, it probably served to debase it. Therefore, the best thing for any individual’s education is to avoid such base and animalistic things. Plato actually argues that in his Republic. So if these Greeks are right, the question now is, does “The Vagina Monologues” serve to increase virtue and human flourishing, or is it base and profane?
A couple of interesting quotes from the piece. From a student:
Some students said that the understanding of academic freedom at a Catholic university should be different from that at a secular university. "We have our own measures of what's good and what's right," said Nicholas Matich, 22, the politics editor of The Irish Rover, a conservative student newspaper. " 'The Vagina Monologues' is performed everywhere else in the academic world. It doesn't mean Notre Dame should do it, too."
From a former faculty member and current watchdog at the University:
"I think the real test of a great university," he [Father Hesburgh] said, "is that you are fair to the opposition and that you get their point of view out there. You engage them. You want to get students' minds working. You don't want mindless Catholics. You want intelligent, successful Catholics."
Does a great University allow anything to be taken seriously, or does it allow only serious things to be taken seriously-including opposing points of view. Is a great University gauged by the number of voices heard on campus or in its ability to discern between voices?
Of course, many will object that gauging what is serious is wholly subjective, and therefore oppressive and given to censorship. I submit that that response may be given by those who need to read more of their Aristotle.
The article does a good job of presenting the lay of the land and some of the special issues involved with being a major University and religiously committed on a significant level at the same time. Does academic freedom/freedom of speech mean anything ought to be honestly presented? Does a Catholic or religious commitment mean that there are other priorities higher up the food chain than “freedom” of academic expression? Can or should some expressions be squelched in the service of these higher priorities?
I was pondering Aristotle and virtue this morning. (That sentence makes me sound smarter than I really am.) But I believe Aristotle would be in favor of excluding some forms of expression from education. If it did not serve the flourishing of the human, it probably served to debase it. Therefore, the best thing for any individual’s education is to avoid such base and animalistic things. Plato actually argues that in his Republic. So if these Greeks are right, the question now is, does “The Vagina Monologues” serve to increase virtue and human flourishing, or is it base and profane?
A couple of interesting quotes from the piece. From a student:
Some students said that the understanding of academic freedom at a Catholic university should be different from that at a secular university. "We have our own measures of what's good and what's right," said Nicholas Matich, 22, the politics editor of The Irish Rover, a conservative student newspaper. " 'The Vagina Monologues' is performed everywhere else in the academic world. It doesn't mean Notre Dame should do it, too."
From a former faculty member and current watchdog at the University:
"I think the real test of a great university," he [Father Hesburgh] said, "is that you are fair to the opposition and that you get their point of view out there. You engage them. You want to get students' minds working. You don't want mindless Catholics. You want intelligent, successful Catholics."
Does a great University allow anything to be taken seriously, or does it allow only serious things to be taken seriously-including opposing points of view. Is a great University gauged by the number of voices heard on campus or in its ability to discern between voices?
Of course, many will object that gauging what is serious is wholly subjective, and therefore oppressive and given to censorship. I submit that that response may be given by those who need to read more of their Aristotle.
Wednesday, February 22, 2006
Moratorium on Theological Pronouncements?
I may have been out of the fray for a while, but I can still recognize a contentious issue when I see one. Brian McLaren has raised the pastoral issue of handling homosexuality in our churches in a rather provocative manner. As one might expect with McLaren, his intent is primarily pastoral, and for that I applaud him. Too often, because it is such a hot-button issue, Christians react callously instead of lovingly to homosexuality, and McLaren is right to provide a corrective voice in that manner.
The approach McLaren takes in the example in his essay is, I think, fundamentally right. Instead of reacting to the question, “what is your church’s stance on homosexuality?” with an immediate (and seemingly dogmatic) answer, it is wise to first ask questions and discover where the person is coming from.
But, as my regular readers might be able to anticipate, I am not comfortable with all of his positions. First, his fundamental conclusion:
Frankly, many of us don't know what we should think about homosexuality. We've heard all sides, but no position has yet won our confidence so that we can say "it seems good to the Holy Spirit and us." That alienates us from both the liberals and conservatives who seem to know exactly what we should think. Even if we are convinced that all homosexual behavior is always sinful, we still want to treat gay and lesbian people with more dignity, gentleness, and respect than our colleagues do. If we think that there may actually be a legitimate context for some homosexual relationships, we know that the biblical arguments are nuanced and multilayered, and the pastoral ramifications are staggeringly complex. We aren't sure if or where lines are to be drawn, nor do we know how to enforce with fairness whatever lines are drawn.
Perhaps we need a five-year moratorium on making pronouncements. In the meantime, we'll practice prayerful Christian dialogue, listening respectfully, disagreeing agreeably. When decisions need to be made, they'll be admittedly provisional. We'll keep our ears attuned to scholars in biblical studies, theology, ethics, psychology, genetics, sociology, and related fields. Then in five years, if we have clarity, we'll speak; if not, we'll set another five years for ongoing reflection. After all, many important issues in church history took centuries to figure out. Maybe this moratorium would help us resist the "winds of doctrine" blowing furiously from the left and right, so we can patiently wait for the wind of the Spirit to set our course.
Maybe five years is an arbitrary figure, but I don’t think any length of time is going to convince McLaren or his sort of emergent minister of any actual position. It is inherent in the postmodern psyche to never actually decide on any proposition. That is why he doesn’t do so now, and it is why he probably won’t have any more answers in 5 or 10 years. And if 2000 years of theology-ranging over every possible position, political régime, and social setting-can’t help them decide today, 5 more years ain’t gonna help.
McLaren is also worried that the political baggage surrounding homosexuality is too manipulative for him to cut through.
Most of the emerging leaders I know share my agony over this question. We fear that the whole issue has been manipulated far more than we realize by political parties seeking to shave percentage points off their opponent's constituency. We see whatever we say get sucked into a vortex of politicized culture-wars rhetoric—and we're pastors, evangelists, church-planters, and disciple-makers, not political culture warriors.
That, honestly, is no excuse for not being able to come to theological clarity about an issue. I have found that those who think politically first and theologically second are the same people who are too frustrated by political concerns to be of any real theological value. And in my reading of McLaren in the past, I tend to think he is political first and theological second.
The fact that an issue appears in political circles has absolutely no bearing on its theological standing. The theological value of a belief is not changed one way or another if one political party adopts it or another abhors it, or if there is a great deal of “confusion” about it in the circles of Manhattan elite. The truth value of the statement “God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself,” is not changed no matter how much political wrangling may occur over it. Or take the issue of pedophilia, which on one level is already a political issue. If it becomes a hot-potato, should we avoid calling it sin?
Because of their adherence to a postmodern view of the world, McLaren and others are unable to accurately apply the injunction to “speak the truth in love.” If you are fuzzy on the concept of “truth” or are incredulous toward it, you will want to jettison it in favor of other concepts. According to so much they say and write, “truth” is oppressive and unnecessarily harsh, and “love” is what we need instead of truth. As I have said before on this blog, the most loving thing we can do as Christians is speak the truth into people’s lives in a way that brings them closer to Christ. And besides, throwing objective truth overboard in favor of love is a crystal clear example of a false dichotomy-one that Christ even rejected.
At one point McLaren declares the biblical passages concerning homosexuality as complex and difficult to interpret (putting aside the fact that plenty of great NT scholars completely disagree). If they are difficult, they are difficult for the same reasons passages on fornication and adultery would be hard (How accepted were homosexual relationships in that culture? Would a married man and a boy be deemed adultery? Fornication? How much sexual “power” did women have, and would their sexual relationships be OK?). So then using the same criteria McLaren uses, when adultery becomes a political third rail and people want the church to be accepting of adultery, we should propose a gag-order on ministers declaring it a sin against God and family.
To be so easily manipulated politically and culturally is a bad position to be in-Scripture and God himself become the play grounds of polls and political breezes.
The approach McLaren takes in the example in his essay is, I think, fundamentally right. Instead of reacting to the question, “what is your church’s stance on homosexuality?” with an immediate (and seemingly dogmatic) answer, it is wise to first ask questions and discover where the person is coming from.
But, as my regular readers might be able to anticipate, I am not comfortable with all of his positions. First, his fundamental conclusion:
Frankly, many of us don't know what we should think about homosexuality. We've heard all sides, but no position has yet won our confidence so that we can say "it seems good to the Holy Spirit and us." That alienates us from both the liberals and conservatives who seem to know exactly what we should think. Even if we are convinced that all homosexual behavior is always sinful, we still want to treat gay and lesbian people with more dignity, gentleness, and respect than our colleagues do. If we think that there may actually be a legitimate context for some homosexual relationships, we know that the biblical arguments are nuanced and multilayered, and the pastoral ramifications are staggeringly complex. We aren't sure if or where lines are to be drawn, nor do we know how to enforce with fairness whatever lines are drawn.
Perhaps we need a five-year moratorium on making pronouncements. In the meantime, we'll practice prayerful Christian dialogue, listening respectfully, disagreeing agreeably. When decisions need to be made, they'll be admittedly provisional. We'll keep our ears attuned to scholars in biblical studies, theology, ethics, psychology, genetics, sociology, and related fields. Then in five years, if we have clarity, we'll speak; if not, we'll set another five years for ongoing reflection. After all, many important issues in church history took centuries to figure out. Maybe this moratorium would help us resist the "winds of doctrine" blowing furiously from the left and right, so we can patiently wait for the wind of the Spirit to set our course.
Maybe five years is an arbitrary figure, but I don’t think any length of time is going to convince McLaren or his sort of emergent minister of any actual position. It is inherent in the postmodern psyche to never actually decide on any proposition. That is why he doesn’t do so now, and it is why he probably won’t have any more answers in 5 or 10 years. And if 2000 years of theology-ranging over every possible position, political régime, and social setting-can’t help them decide today, 5 more years ain’t gonna help.
McLaren is also worried that the political baggage surrounding homosexuality is too manipulative for him to cut through.
Most of the emerging leaders I know share my agony over this question. We fear that the whole issue has been manipulated far more than we realize by political parties seeking to shave percentage points off their opponent's constituency. We see whatever we say get sucked into a vortex of politicized culture-wars rhetoric—and we're pastors, evangelists, church-planters, and disciple-makers, not political culture warriors.
That, honestly, is no excuse for not being able to come to theological clarity about an issue. I have found that those who think politically first and theologically second are the same people who are too frustrated by political concerns to be of any real theological value. And in my reading of McLaren in the past, I tend to think he is political first and theological second.
The fact that an issue appears in political circles has absolutely no bearing on its theological standing. The theological value of a belief is not changed one way or another if one political party adopts it or another abhors it, or if there is a great deal of “confusion” about it in the circles of Manhattan elite. The truth value of the statement “God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself,” is not changed no matter how much political wrangling may occur over it. Or take the issue of pedophilia, which on one level is already a political issue. If it becomes a hot-potato, should we avoid calling it sin?
Because of their adherence to a postmodern view of the world, McLaren and others are unable to accurately apply the injunction to “speak the truth in love.” If you are fuzzy on the concept of “truth” or are incredulous toward it, you will want to jettison it in favor of other concepts. According to so much they say and write, “truth” is oppressive and unnecessarily harsh, and “love” is what we need instead of truth. As I have said before on this blog, the most loving thing we can do as Christians is speak the truth into people’s lives in a way that brings them closer to Christ. And besides, throwing objective truth overboard in favor of love is a crystal clear example of a false dichotomy-one that Christ even rejected.
At one point McLaren declares the biblical passages concerning homosexuality as complex and difficult to interpret (putting aside the fact that plenty of great NT scholars completely disagree). If they are difficult, they are difficult for the same reasons passages on fornication and adultery would be hard (How accepted were homosexual relationships in that culture? Would a married man and a boy be deemed adultery? Fornication? How much sexual “power” did women have, and would their sexual relationships be OK?). So then using the same criteria McLaren uses, when adultery becomes a political third rail and people want the church to be accepting of adultery, we should propose a gag-order on ministers declaring it a sin against God and family.
To be so easily manipulated politically and culturally is a bad position to be in-Scripture and God himself become the play grounds of polls and political breezes.
Christianity and the Victory of Reason
BreakPoint The Victory of Reason
I was recently made aware of the author Rodney Stark and his historical work concerning the role Christianity played in the formation of civilization (Stark is not a Christian). To make a long story short, it is not what many today want you to think.
This article by Colson highlights this fact through one of Stark's books. Another of value (it has been recommended-I have not read it yet) should be For the Glory of God.
Great article-I encourage you to follow up on Stark's work.
I was recently made aware of the author Rodney Stark and his historical work concerning the role Christianity played in the formation of civilization (Stark is not a Christian). To make a long story short, it is not what many today want you to think.
This article by Colson highlights this fact through one of Stark's books. Another of value (it has been recommended-I have not read it yet) should be For the Glory of God.
Great article-I encourage you to follow up on Stark's work.
Hearing God-The Still Small Voice
I have been a part of a Pentecostal tradition all my life, and am happy to still be a part of that same tradition. One of the issues that arise among Pentecostals concerns the spectacular: revelations from God to certain individuals through dreams, visions, etc. In fact, there are waves in the Pentecostal tradition that put an abundance of weight on those forms of communication from God to the point of almost ignoring what we might call the “still small voice” of God.
I have a theory, and I have expressed it a handful of times to friends and others who are burdened with the fact that Christ has not shown up in their bedroom to tell them what to do. In short, because we have such abundant access to Scripture and the wisdom of the saints, we are responsible for hearing God through His Word and through a personal relationship with Christ. The spectacular events tend to come to those who are relatively immature in the faith.
I was reading Dallas Willard’s book Hearing God: Developing a Conversational Relationship with God this morning and fell upon the same idea. In his words:
It would not be too much to say, however, that where these phenomena were the main, as opposed to occasional means of interaction, it indicates a less developed spiritual life both in the individual and in the church group. I am not trying to be judgmental here; I am merely trying to be helpful in pointing out the kind of life with God into which we should expect to grow-a life in which one hears from God amid and within frequent times of conversational prayer. (pg. 111)
He quotes E. Stanley Jones as saying:
He [Jesus] got his guidance through prayer as you and I do. That is, He got His guidance when in control of His faculties, and not when out of control as in dreams. (pg. 111)
Willard’s biblical occasion for these comments is fascinating. In Numbers 12, Miriam and Aaron are complaining that Moses has taken an Ethiopian for a wife, and their grievance amounts to, “but God speaks to us in spectacular ways-how can Moses be so wrong!” God’s reply:
And he said, "Hear my words: If there is a prophet among you, I the LORD make myself known to him in a vision; I speak with him in a dream. Not so with my servant Moses. He is faithful in all my house. With him I speak mouth to mouth, clearly, and not in riddles, and he beholds the form of the LORD.
All this to say that God wants us to live in an active and breathing relationship with Him so we are able to discern the voice of God even when it is still and small-and that represents a deepened and developed relationship representative of Christ’s relationship with the Father.
I have a theory, and I have expressed it a handful of times to friends and others who are burdened with the fact that Christ has not shown up in their bedroom to tell them what to do. In short, because we have such abundant access to Scripture and the wisdom of the saints, we are responsible for hearing God through His Word and through a personal relationship with Christ. The spectacular events tend to come to those who are relatively immature in the faith.
I was reading Dallas Willard’s book Hearing God: Developing a Conversational Relationship with God this morning and fell upon the same idea. In his words:
It would not be too much to say, however, that where these phenomena were the main, as opposed to occasional means of interaction, it indicates a less developed spiritual life both in the individual and in the church group. I am not trying to be judgmental here; I am merely trying to be helpful in pointing out the kind of life with God into which we should expect to grow-a life in which one hears from God amid and within frequent times of conversational prayer. (pg. 111)
He quotes E. Stanley Jones as saying:
He [Jesus] got his guidance through prayer as you and I do. That is, He got His guidance when in control of His faculties, and not when out of control as in dreams. (pg. 111)
Willard’s biblical occasion for these comments is fascinating. In Numbers 12, Miriam and Aaron are complaining that Moses has taken an Ethiopian for a wife, and their grievance amounts to, “but God speaks to us in spectacular ways-how can Moses be so wrong!” God’s reply:
And he said, "Hear my words: If there is a prophet among you, I the LORD make myself known to him in a vision; I speak with him in a dream. Not so with my servant Moses. He is faithful in all my house. With him I speak mouth to mouth, clearly, and not in riddles, and he beholds the form of the LORD.
All this to say that God wants us to live in an active and breathing relationship with Him so we are able to discern the voice of God even when it is still and small-and that represents a deepened and developed relationship representative of Christ’s relationship with the Father.
Thursday, February 16, 2006
An "Intelligent" Fork In The Road?
Some of the responses to Intelligent Design have been thoughtful and reasoned, others have been, well, a little shallow. One set of responses coming from within the Christian community has been interesting, and is highlighted by this letter to the editor in a paper in Fort Collins, CO. The original opinion piece was inaccessible.
This letter, though I may not assent to everything it seems to support, has one extremely good point going for it. The author remarks:
Chorpenning [the original opinion writer-a minister] affirmed Judith Hannah’s (geosciences, Colorado State University) remarks that Christianity is simply faith-based stories with no connection to what is verifiable in our physical world. Many people are content with such a faith, but many others, including myself, are not.
I also affirm the statement Chorpenning made as he closed: “I claim with strong conviction that God is the source of life and Creator of the universe.” But for me, I need more than unverifiable faith-based stories for those strong convictions. So I welcome the fact that science is increasingly verifying that blind chance is not sufficient to explain this world.
The difference is between the two authors is telling. Chorpenning represents a view in which Christians believe science debunks the Bible, but still want to hold to their faith. In order to do so, they feel they must relativise the truth claims of Scripture and believe on blind faith that it is “true” is some kind of non-objective sense. On the other side is the author of the piece I cited, and myself, who believe that Christianity makes truth claims about reality in the same sense that science makes truth claims about reality.
The more robust faith is the second kind. The first kind hides its head in the sand and fails to take Scripture seriously while taking the “outside” world seriously. The stronger faith is one that is able to take in the claims of skeptics and scientists who disagree with religious claims and work through them rationally and thoughtfully. That process results in a deepened and strengthened faith-the kind of faith Scripture tries to encourage.
I believe the kind of faith that needs to hide Scriptural truth claims behind a veil of religious relativism is a kind of sin-it is an act that completely misses the mark of loving God with all our minds, souls, and hearts. It leaves believers in the position where they think they can believe one thing “in the church” and a completely contradictory thing “outside” the church.
In all honesty, the point of view represented by Chorpenning is, I believe, a direct result of two schools of thought-Higher Criticism and Postmodernism.
This letter, though I may not assent to everything it seems to support, has one extremely good point going for it. The author remarks:
Chorpenning [the original opinion writer-a minister] affirmed Judith Hannah’s (geosciences, Colorado State University) remarks that Christianity is simply faith-based stories with no connection to what is verifiable in our physical world. Many people are content with such a faith, but many others, including myself, are not.
I also affirm the statement Chorpenning made as he closed: “I claim with strong conviction that God is the source of life and Creator of the universe.” But for me, I need more than unverifiable faith-based stories for those strong convictions. So I welcome the fact that science is increasingly verifying that blind chance is not sufficient to explain this world.
The difference is between the two authors is telling. Chorpenning represents a view in which Christians believe science debunks the Bible, but still want to hold to their faith. In order to do so, they feel they must relativise the truth claims of Scripture and believe on blind faith that it is “true” is some kind of non-objective sense. On the other side is the author of the piece I cited, and myself, who believe that Christianity makes truth claims about reality in the same sense that science makes truth claims about reality.
The more robust faith is the second kind. The first kind hides its head in the sand and fails to take Scripture seriously while taking the “outside” world seriously. The stronger faith is one that is able to take in the claims of skeptics and scientists who disagree with religious claims and work through them rationally and thoughtfully. That process results in a deepened and strengthened faith-the kind of faith Scripture tries to encourage.
I believe the kind of faith that needs to hide Scriptural truth claims behind a veil of religious relativism is a kind of sin-it is an act that completely misses the mark of loving God with all our minds, souls, and hearts. It leaves believers in the position where they think they can believe one thing “in the church” and a completely contradictory thing “outside” the church.
In all honesty, the point of view represented by Chorpenning is, I believe, a direct result of two schools of thought-Higher Criticism and Postmodernism.
Wednesday, February 15, 2006
Worldviews Clash Over Embryos
60 Minutes recently did a special on embryonic stem cell research. The piece was interesting for a couple of different reasons. First of all, it completely failed to mention the recent scandal involving Korean scientists and their forged research results promising great advances in embryonic stem cell research. Since the field has been dominated with that news in recent weeks, it is extraordinary that 60 Minutes did not mention it.
The second reason was the clash of worldviews apparent in the piece. On one side of the debate was Robert George of Princeton and the President’s Council on Bioethics, and on the other was Art Caplan, a bioethicist at the University of Pennsylvania. The first move in favor of embryonic stem cell research by Caplan was the appeal to pity, or an appeal to possible utilitarian advances.
"You got people in wheelchairs. You got people trying to understand how to cure cancer," Caplan says. "You know, people who want to understand genetic diseases and you have embryos frozen that no one will ever use for any purpose whatsoever. There’s a moral equation here, too. And it seems to be to lead toward research, not just perpetual freezing."
On the other side was George arguing for the inherent value of embryos:
Asked why the embryos slated for destruction shouldn't be made available for research, George says, "The principle that the president laid down and which I support is one that says all human beings, irrespective of age or size or stage of development or condition of dependency, possess the same human dignity, because human dignity is inherent."
One of the problems with Caplan’s appeal to a sense of pity-there are sick and needy people who need this kind of help-is that it obfuscates the real issue at hand-the moral status of embryos. Now, in fairness, Caplan has certainly already decided that embryos are not persons, and therefore not rightful bearers of human rights. Another problem with that kind of appeal, is that if it is pressed to a deeper level of pity or utility, almost any action can be justified to reach good ends.
I believe the biology bears out George’s position, however. And if that is the case, then an embryo is a human whether it looks like a 12 year-old or not. Thus, it demands our respect and the protection of its rights.
But it doesn’t look like a 12 year-old. And that was the next move the host of the program, Lesley Stahl made. This is a great exchange between Stahl and George:
"Are you equating these embryos, these frozen embryos, with a full-grown man or woman?" Stahl asks.
"I’m saying they have the dignity of a human being, the way a full-grown man or woman has the dignity of a human being," he replies.
"And you’re equating them?" Stahl asks.
"Oh, sure," George says. "Yeah, I’m equating them in terms of human dignity."
What does he mean by "dignity"?
"I mean, shouldn’t simply be thrown out in the trash. Should be treated respectfully, the way we treat the remains of human beings at later stages of development," George explains.
"Like what? Like have burials?" Stahl asks.
"Buried or burned," George replies.
"You’re saying, take these little bunches of cells, and have burials for them?" Stahl asks.
"Well, you say bunches of cells in order to make burials sound weird," George says. "But those bunches of cells are very unique bunches of cells. Those are human beings in the earliest stages of their natural development. You were one once; I was one once."
If Stahl’s reasoning were pressed, you could replace each reference to embryos or bunches of cells with “really old people” or “people without arms and legs” or “people in comas” or “people much uglier than me.” The appearance of a person is not the necessary condition of his or her personhood. Appearances are contingent properties of persons; they are not a part of the substance of the person.
This raises a deeper worldview problem in our culture. We no longer think in clear categories, so the kind of mistake Stahl makes seems right to us. We typically cannot tell the difference between properties and essences, and thus we end up labeling things improperly. Embryos in their essence are persons, and their contingent set of properties will arrive given maturity. Therefore, whatever set of contingent properties they have or fail to have at some level of development is irrelevant.
The second reason was the clash of worldviews apparent in the piece. On one side of the debate was Robert George of Princeton and the President’s Council on Bioethics, and on the other was Art Caplan, a bioethicist at the University of Pennsylvania. The first move in favor of embryonic stem cell research by Caplan was the appeal to pity, or an appeal to possible utilitarian advances.
"You got people in wheelchairs. You got people trying to understand how to cure cancer," Caplan says. "You know, people who want to understand genetic diseases and you have embryos frozen that no one will ever use for any purpose whatsoever. There’s a moral equation here, too. And it seems to be to lead toward research, not just perpetual freezing."
On the other side was George arguing for the inherent value of embryos:
Asked why the embryos slated for destruction shouldn't be made available for research, George says, "The principle that the president laid down and which I support is one that says all human beings, irrespective of age or size or stage of development or condition of dependency, possess the same human dignity, because human dignity is inherent."
One of the problems with Caplan’s appeal to a sense of pity-there are sick and needy people who need this kind of help-is that it obfuscates the real issue at hand-the moral status of embryos. Now, in fairness, Caplan has certainly already decided that embryos are not persons, and therefore not rightful bearers of human rights. Another problem with that kind of appeal, is that if it is pressed to a deeper level of pity or utility, almost any action can be justified to reach good ends.
I believe the biology bears out George’s position, however. And if that is the case, then an embryo is a human whether it looks like a 12 year-old or not. Thus, it demands our respect and the protection of its rights.
But it doesn’t look like a 12 year-old. And that was the next move the host of the program, Lesley Stahl made. This is a great exchange between Stahl and George:
"Are you equating these embryos, these frozen embryos, with a full-grown man or woman?" Stahl asks.
"I’m saying they have the dignity of a human being, the way a full-grown man or woman has the dignity of a human being," he replies.
"And you’re equating them?" Stahl asks.
"Oh, sure," George says. "Yeah, I’m equating them in terms of human dignity."
What does he mean by "dignity"?
"I mean, shouldn’t simply be thrown out in the trash. Should be treated respectfully, the way we treat the remains of human beings at later stages of development," George explains.
"Like what? Like have burials?" Stahl asks.
"Buried or burned," George replies.
"You’re saying, take these little bunches of cells, and have burials for them?" Stahl asks.
"Well, you say bunches of cells in order to make burials sound weird," George says. "But those bunches of cells are very unique bunches of cells. Those are human beings in the earliest stages of their natural development. You were one once; I was one once."
If Stahl’s reasoning were pressed, you could replace each reference to embryos or bunches of cells with “really old people” or “people without arms and legs” or “people in comas” or “people much uglier than me.” The appearance of a person is not the necessary condition of his or her personhood. Appearances are contingent properties of persons; they are not a part of the substance of the person.
This raises a deeper worldview problem in our culture. We no longer think in clear categories, so the kind of mistake Stahl makes seems right to us. We typically cannot tell the difference between properties and essences, and thus we end up labeling things improperly. Embryos in their essence are persons, and their contingent set of properties will arrive given maturity. Therefore, whatever set of contingent properties they have or fail to have at some level of development is irrelevant.
I Have Been Away...
I first of all feel I need to do a little explaining regarding my absence recently. I have been busy with work recently in the kinds of ways that distract me from just about anything else. These are the kinds of seasons in life in which it is hard to grow spiritually for me, but they are the times that inevitably produce the greatest growth if I pay attention.
The reason the blog has suffered is because these kinds of seasons block out just about everything “else” in my life while I try to get the pressing matters figured out. I apologize for being so absent for so long.
A passage of Scripture that has brought me a great deal of comfort in the past couple of weeks is in Proverbs 3. The first half is familiar, but the last half is what brought it home to me recently.
5Trust in the LORD with all your heart,
and do not lean on your own understanding.
6In all your ways acknowledge him,
and he will make straight your paths.
7Be not wise in your own eyes;
fear the LORD, and turn away from evil.
8It will be healing to your flesh
and refreshment to your bones.
That last word, “refreshment” cam mean “medicine.” I love that: trust in God can be healing and medicine.
Soli Deo Gloria
The reason the blog has suffered is because these kinds of seasons block out just about everything “else” in my life while I try to get the pressing matters figured out. I apologize for being so absent for so long.
A passage of Scripture that has brought me a great deal of comfort in the past couple of weeks is in Proverbs 3. The first half is familiar, but the last half is what brought it home to me recently.
5Trust in the LORD with all your heart,
and do not lean on your own understanding.
6In all your ways acknowledge him,
and he will make straight your paths.
7Be not wise in your own eyes;
fear the LORD, and turn away from evil.
8It will be healing to your flesh
and refreshment to your bones.
That last word, “refreshment” cam mean “medicine.” I love that: trust in God can be healing and medicine.
Soli Deo Gloria
Wednesday, January 04, 2006
Coal Miners and Postmodern Truth
This horrible situation with the miners in West Virginia provides a crystal clear example of why Postmodernism is utterly false, and in fact, utterly destructive. Let’s take a look at the belief that 12 of the 13 miners were found alive.
It was reported on all the newscasts last night. At least twice on CNN people were asked for their source of the news. Their answer? CNN. The headlines in the papers today almost all read something like, “12 of 13 Miners Alive.” It turns out that the sources most of the media used to confirm this belief were other media outlets.
It was clearly a meaningful belief. The news anchor I saw last night was overjoyed for the family members and friends of the miners he had come to know in the last two days. There was even talk of kissing the coal-stained faces of the survivors. We can also guess with certainty that it was a deeply meaningful belief held by the family and friends of the miners. It is even possible that they made significant decisions after they heard their relatives were alive.
In other words, the belief “12 of 13 miners are alive” was confirmed in a web-of-belief fashion, was held sincerely by an identifiable culture (at least two in this case), and was deeply meaningful to all of them. The perfect example of a postmodern description of what makes a true belief.
Only one problem-it was false.
Postmodernism, for all its verbose wrangling in the vain attempt to be profound has no real tools for handling reality. If this were not such a publicly verifiable event, the pomo response would be something like, “It was true for them.” But that stock response is revealed here to be the horse hokey it is. “True for them” almost literally makes no sense.
Truth is gauged by correspondence to reality. Just like the survival of miners in West Virginia, web-like confirmation, sincerity, and meaningfulness cannot make a belief true.
It was reported on all the newscasts last night. At least twice on CNN people were asked for their source of the news. Their answer? CNN. The headlines in the papers today almost all read something like, “12 of 13 Miners Alive.” It turns out that the sources most of the media used to confirm this belief were other media outlets.
It was clearly a meaningful belief. The news anchor I saw last night was overjoyed for the family members and friends of the miners he had come to know in the last two days. There was even talk of kissing the coal-stained faces of the survivors. We can also guess with certainty that it was a deeply meaningful belief held by the family and friends of the miners. It is even possible that they made significant decisions after they heard their relatives were alive.
In other words, the belief “12 of 13 miners are alive” was confirmed in a web-of-belief fashion, was held sincerely by an identifiable culture (at least two in this case), and was deeply meaningful to all of them. The perfect example of a postmodern description of what makes a true belief.
Only one problem-it was false.
Postmodernism, for all its verbose wrangling in the vain attempt to be profound has no real tools for handling reality. If this were not such a publicly verifiable event, the pomo response would be something like, “It was true for them.” But that stock response is revealed here to be the horse hokey it is. “True for them” almost literally makes no sense.
Truth is gauged by correspondence to reality. Just like the survival of miners in West Virginia, web-like confirmation, sincerity, and meaningfulness cannot make a belief true.
Tuesday, December 20, 2005
Intelligent Design and the Judge
The decision has been handed down, and it is probably no real shock that the judge in the ID court case in Dover, PA has ruled against ID being taught in the classroom. I argued before that the details that gave rise to this case were probably weak, and a little silly, and I am sure there will come another court battle in the future on better and more solid ground. Yahoo. HT: ID In The News
What surprised me the most were some of the comments coming from the judge. I must admit that when I first heard some of these excerpts quoted on the radio news, I just about flipped out of my seat. So here is the judge’s take on the parents and school board members driving the ID issue:
It is ironic that several of these individuals, who so staunchly and proudly touted their religious convictions in public, would time and again lie to cover their tracks and disguise the real purpose behind the ID Policy.
Maybe judges often accuse plaintiffs or defendants in a case of lying, I don’t know. But this is especially egregious. It reveals a profound prejudice on the part of the judge in which he seems to believe that no motivation on the part of a religious believer (probably just Christians) can also have real and legitimate scientific value as well. If it comes from a believer, it must be just religion and thus a private matter and not something suitable for the public square. It appears from this excerpt that what was at trial in the judge’s mind was the teaching of religion in the public square, and not the actual science involved in the case.
It will be objected here, as it often is, that ID is religion and not science. My point is that that accusation is a separate issue than what was presented in the Dover case, and it seems to be a premise snuck in by the judge. I had a friend who was called to testify in the case, and at the last minute was taken from the witness list because Michael Behe preceded him and had apparently done a bang-up job with the science. Maybe the judge was sick that week.
Here is more of the measured and thoughtful ruling at a point in which the judge is preempting the “activist court” charge:
Rather, this case came to us as the result of the activism of an ill-informed faction on a school board, aided by a national public interest law firm eager to find a constitutional test case on ID, who in combination drove the Board to adopt an imprudent and ultimately unconstitutional policy. The breathtaking inanity of the Board’s decision is evident when considered against the factual backdrop which has now been fully revealed through this trial.
Honestly, if I had ever used the words “ill-informed” or “breathtaking inanity” in any of my graduate papers to describe an opposing point of view, I would have been chastised severely as letting colloquialisms and personal hobbyhorses get in the way of serious critique. Is this language worthy of a serious opinion?
And to say that the factual backdrop has been “fully revealed” is just nonsense. The judge had an agenda and his ruling makes that abundantly clear.
To put a fine point on that accusation, the judge went on to declare that teachers simply can not critique the theory of evolution in the classroom. For what must be the umpteenth time on this blog, are we comfortable with a single, state-mandated position forced on students and teachers in any field of education? The judge’s words:
To preserve the separation of church and state mandated by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Art. I, § 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, we will enter an order permanently enjoining Defendants from maintaining the ID Policy in any school within the Dover Area School District, from requiring teachers to denigrate or disparage the scientific theory of evolution, and from requiring teachers to refer to a religious, alternative theory known as ID.
Round two can’t be too far off…
What surprised me the most were some of the comments coming from the judge. I must admit that when I first heard some of these excerpts quoted on the radio news, I just about flipped out of my seat. So here is the judge’s take on the parents and school board members driving the ID issue:
It is ironic that several of these individuals, who so staunchly and proudly touted their religious convictions in public, would time and again lie to cover their tracks and disguise the real purpose behind the ID Policy.
Maybe judges often accuse plaintiffs or defendants in a case of lying, I don’t know. But this is especially egregious. It reveals a profound prejudice on the part of the judge in which he seems to believe that no motivation on the part of a religious believer (probably just Christians) can also have real and legitimate scientific value as well. If it comes from a believer, it must be just religion and thus a private matter and not something suitable for the public square. It appears from this excerpt that what was at trial in the judge’s mind was the teaching of religion in the public square, and not the actual science involved in the case.
It will be objected here, as it often is, that ID is religion and not science. My point is that that accusation is a separate issue than what was presented in the Dover case, and it seems to be a premise snuck in by the judge. I had a friend who was called to testify in the case, and at the last minute was taken from the witness list because Michael Behe preceded him and had apparently done a bang-up job with the science. Maybe the judge was sick that week.
Here is more of the measured and thoughtful ruling at a point in which the judge is preempting the “activist court” charge:
Rather, this case came to us as the result of the activism of an ill-informed faction on a school board, aided by a national public interest law firm eager to find a constitutional test case on ID, who in combination drove the Board to adopt an imprudent and ultimately unconstitutional policy. The breathtaking inanity of the Board’s decision is evident when considered against the factual backdrop which has now been fully revealed through this trial.
Honestly, if I had ever used the words “ill-informed” or “breathtaking inanity” in any of my graduate papers to describe an opposing point of view, I would have been chastised severely as letting colloquialisms and personal hobbyhorses get in the way of serious critique. Is this language worthy of a serious opinion?
And to say that the factual backdrop has been “fully revealed” is just nonsense. The judge had an agenda and his ruling makes that abundantly clear.
To put a fine point on that accusation, the judge went on to declare that teachers simply can not critique the theory of evolution in the classroom. For what must be the umpteenth time on this blog, are we comfortable with a single, state-mandated position forced on students and teachers in any field of education? The judge’s words:
To preserve the separation of church and state mandated by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Art. I, § 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, we will enter an order permanently enjoining Defendants from maintaining the ID Policy in any school within the Dover Area School District, from requiring teachers to denigrate or disparage the scientific theory of evolution, and from requiring teachers to refer to a religious, alternative theory known as ID.
Round two can’t be too far off…
Thursday, December 15, 2005
Intelligent Design Counfounds Another Author
I was perusing a few sites I visit looking for juicy post topics when I ran across this article by one J.M. Tyree called, “Malevolent Design: Intelligent Design isn’t just bad science, it’s bad religion” on The Revealer, a generally informative website dedicated to religion in the media and news. At first I had hoped for an interesting take on the possible extensions of Intelligent Design like a plurality of gods, an über-intelligence, or something else novel (near the end of the article, the author finally made it to the surmises of a malevolent designer). Instead, I got a barrage of bad research, bad thinking, and the same old hackneyed responses to ID.
In a few ways, you could tell the author had done their homework on some of the general philosophical background involved, but unfortunately, most of that research had nothing to do with the background of ID. More on that below. For instance, the author quotes Duane Gish as a defender of ID. Talk about a stretch for a straw man. Here is his quote:
"How are you going to explain that step-by-step by evolution, by natural selection," says an ID proponent named Gish. "It cannot be done!"
Note two things (besides Gish not being part of the ID cadre of scientists). First, Gish’s quote regards gradual macroevolution, not design. Second, it is clearly used as an inflammatory device within the article and not in a means conducive to charitable representation.
Now for the bad thinking. Instead of dealing with the scientific claims of ID, the author quickly morphs into the classic stand-by reaction to theism: the problem of evil. The reason this is a bad leap in reasoning is that ID does not make moral claims on the design and current shape of the universe. Certainly many of its adherents are theists, and they would make such claims, but ID is about the science of “specified complexity,” and other, biological, mathematical, and chemical realities. And as so many of ID’s defenders have pointed out, the science of ID does not make any claims stemming from or leading directly to any specific religion. ID’s claims are not moral.
One of the core passages in the author’s train of thought:
Hume, a notorious antagonist of religion, wrote in carefully and artfully constructed forms like the quasi-fictional Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1777), perhaps in order to avoid trouble with the authorities. There, Hume put forward what are now considered the classic objections to the teleological argument, which also apply in spades to ID. The most devastating objection is that even if you assume the world was designed, it does not appear to be designed by a very nice deity. Bearing in mind that the Christian God must be all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good, wouldn't there be some way for God to prevent events like the tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, or Nagasaki? As Hume pointed out, if he can't, he's not all powerful, and if he won't, then he's not all good. Theologians do have answers for these problems -- God must allow the universe to proceed in an orderly fashion, and an orderly universe appears to require storms, earthquakes, and volcanos -- but the answers are not very satisfying when confronted with the epic scale of human suffering.
It is fine if someone wants to write on the problem of evil and the teleological argument, but they should pick the right context. The author makes the religious jump himself (I don’t know if J.M. is male or female), and then claims ID is religious by its very nature. A little disingenuous. This is a little bit like me picking on the recent spate of Christmas-in-the-public-square issues and arguing for the return of prayer in public schools. There may be some connection on some level, but it is the wrong argument to make given the context.
Either the article is about the science of ID, or about providence. If the author wanted to deal with the problem of evil and providence, he should have dealt with a segment of ID’s supporters and their theology rather than painting ID with a theological brush and assuming there is no difference between the science of ID and the theology of Christianity.
Additionally, this quote highlights the jump in reasoning made by the author from scientific and mathematical claims to religious and moral claims.
Speaking in religion's own terms, ID is not only an argument from design, it's also an argument for providence, God's good guidance of the universe, human history, and individual moral choice.
The author is apparently assuming ID is a kind of theology and hence is responsible for answering all the religious issues held by the author. Again, some who like the ID movement will make the jump from the science to providence, but ID doesn’t do that.
What happens in this article is nearly universal in ID’s critics. Instead of taking a real look at the scientific claims, they summarily dismiss even the possibility of ID being a science and then proceed with a self-derived sense of justification to the ad hominum attacks. As an example:
Yet aside from its nonentity status as a scientific theory -- a "theory" must be provable or disprovable ("falsifiable") by experiment, therefore Intelligent Design doesn't qualify…
And macroevolution and atheism are “provable or disprovable…by experiment”? As I have noted elsewhere, using the notion of “falsifiability” is a slippery one for a theory whose primary premises are just as philosophical as anyone else’s. And besides, those who understand ID could remark that there are highly developed mathematical models in support of ID’s contentions that can be tested in this fashion.
The argument is called "irreducible complexity," a term that along with the even more voodooish "specified complexity," forms the bedrock of ID's pseudoscientific vocabulary.
I guess you win if you label your competition as “voodooish.”
Instead of being something thoughtful or something that addresses some of the real issues out there surrounding ID, this article seems to simply be a way for the author to get some frustration off of his chest.
In a few ways, you could tell the author had done their homework on some of the general philosophical background involved, but unfortunately, most of that research had nothing to do with the background of ID. More on that below. For instance, the author quotes Duane Gish as a defender of ID. Talk about a stretch for a straw man. Here is his quote:
"How are you going to explain that step-by-step by evolution, by natural selection," says an ID proponent named Gish. "It cannot be done!"
Note two things (besides Gish not being part of the ID cadre of scientists). First, Gish’s quote regards gradual macroevolution, not design. Second, it is clearly used as an inflammatory device within the article and not in a means conducive to charitable representation.
Now for the bad thinking. Instead of dealing with the scientific claims of ID, the author quickly morphs into the classic stand-by reaction to theism: the problem of evil. The reason this is a bad leap in reasoning is that ID does not make moral claims on the design and current shape of the universe. Certainly many of its adherents are theists, and they would make such claims, but ID is about the science of “specified complexity,” and other, biological, mathematical, and chemical realities. And as so many of ID’s defenders have pointed out, the science of ID does not make any claims stemming from or leading directly to any specific religion. ID’s claims are not moral.
One of the core passages in the author’s train of thought:
Hume, a notorious antagonist of religion, wrote in carefully and artfully constructed forms like the quasi-fictional Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1777), perhaps in order to avoid trouble with the authorities. There, Hume put forward what are now considered the classic objections to the teleological argument, which also apply in spades to ID. The most devastating objection is that even if you assume the world was designed, it does not appear to be designed by a very nice deity. Bearing in mind that the Christian God must be all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good, wouldn't there be some way for God to prevent events like the tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, or Nagasaki? As Hume pointed out, if he can't, he's not all powerful, and if he won't, then he's not all good. Theologians do have answers for these problems -- God must allow the universe to proceed in an orderly fashion, and an orderly universe appears to require storms, earthquakes, and volcanos -- but the answers are not very satisfying when confronted with the epic scale of human suffering.
It is fine if someone wants to write on the problem of evil and the teleological argument, but they should pick the right context. The author makes the religious jump himself (I don’t know if J.M. is male or female), and then claims ID is religious by its very nature. A little disingenuous. This is a little bit like me picking on the recent spate of Christmas-in-the-public-square issues and arguing for the return of prayer in public schools. There may be some connection on some level, but it is the wrong argument to make given the context.
Either the article is about the science of ID, or about providence. If the author wanted to deal with the problem of evil and providence, he should have dealt with a segment of ID’s supporters and their theology rather than painting ID with a theological brush and assuming there is no difference between the science of ID and the theology of Christianity.
Additionally, this quote highlights the jump in reasoning made by the author from scientific and mathematical claims to religious and moral claims.
Speaking in religion's own terms, ID is not only an argument from design, it's also an argument for providence, God's good guidance of the universe, human history, and individual moral choice.
The author is apparently assuming ID is a kind of theology and hence is responsible for answering all the religious issues held by the author. Again, some who like the ID movement will make the jump from the science to providence, but ID doesn’t do that.
What happens in this article is nearly universal in ID’s critics. Instead of taking a real look at the scientific claims, they summarily dismiss even the possibility of ID being a science and then proceed with a self-derived sense of justification to the ad hominum attacks. As an example:
Yet aside from its nonentity status as a scientific theory -- a "theory" must be provable or disprovable ("falsifiable") by experiment, therefore Intelligent Design doesn't qualify…
And macroevolution and atheism are “provable or disprovable…by experiment”? As I have noted elsewhere, using the notion of “falsifiability” is a slippery one for a theory whose primary premises are just as philosophical as anyone else’s. And besides, those who understand ID could remark that there are highly developed mathematical models in support of ID’s contentions that can be tested in this fashion.
The argument is called "irreducible complexity," a term that along with the even more voodooish "specified complexity," forms the bedrock of ID's pseudoscientific vocabulary.
I guess you win if you label your competition as “voodooish.”
Instead of being something thoughtful or something that addresses some of the real issues out there surrounding ID, this article seems to simply be a way for the author to get some frustration off of his chest.
Wednesday, December 14, 2005
Authentic Spirituality?
I wish I could take credit for the following idea, but I heard it today listening to the latest edition of the Mars Hill Audio Journal. The executive director, Ken Myers, is a sharp and broad-reaching cultural critic, and the basic thought on “authentic” faith belongs to him.
He wondered out loud while introducing a segment on the recent surge in Wicca and neo-paganism, about how the word “authentic” has been applied lately to religion and spirituality. It is an idea that is often used (and was one point in the discussion about neo-paganism) to reject historical Christianity, or at the least, to reject institutionalized forms of Christianity. Instead, people who search for “authentic spirituality” usually walk away from historical faiths in favor of newer, more personalized faith practices and beliefs.
One point the interviewee made about her book on Wicca is that its tenants tend to be very person-specific and fairly malleable. Wicca, along with so much of American spirituality, gives its believers the chance to make religion in their own image.
Myers’ comment was on the ironic linguistic twist involved. “Authentic” literally means something that can be authenticated-something that is demonstrably real and objective. We still use “authentic” in this way to describe things like artifacts or art, as in an “authentic Navajo pot” or the “authentic self-portrait by the artist.” The point is, the label “authentic” describes the genuine article.
But now, and this is no less true in evangelical circles, “authentic” means “subjective.” The upshot is that people are ostensibly searching for the real thing when in fact they are looking inward and creating a cheap reproduction of what is truly spiritually authentic.
In the recent evangelical reaction against the church growth movement and the evil specter of Modernism, have we bastardized the term “authentic”? Have we helped lead people out of the church and the embrace of orthodoxy just so they can craft their own faith in search of the supposedly authentic?
He wondered out loud while introducing a segment on the recent surge in Wicca and neo-paganism, about how the word “authentic” has been applied lately to religion and spirituality. It is an idea that is often used (and was one point in the discussion about neo-paganism) to reject historical Christianity, or at the least, to reject institutionalized forms of Christianity. Instead, people who search for “authentic spirituality” usually walk away from historical faiths in favor of newer, more personalized faith practices and beliefs.
One point the interviewee made about her book on Wicca is that its tenants tend to be very person-specific and fairly malleable. Wicca, along with so much of American spirituality, gives its believers the chance to make religion in their own image.
Myers’ comment was on the ironic linguistic twist involved. “Authentic” literally means something that can be authenticated-something that is demonstrably real and objective. We still use “authentic” in this way to describe things like artifacts or art, as in an “authentic Navajo pot” or the “authentic self-portrait by the artist.” The point is, the label “authentic” describes the genuine article.
But now, and this is no less true in evangelical circles, “authentic” means “subjective.” The upshot is that people are ostensibly searching for the real thing when in fact they are looking inward and creating a cheap reproduction of what is truly spiritually authentic.
In the recent evangelical reaction against the church growth movement and the evil specter of Modernism, have we bastardized the term “authentic”? Have we helped lead people out of the church and the embrace of orthodoxy just so they can craft their own faith in search of the supposedly authentic?
Monday, December 12, 2005
Book Review: C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea
Victor Reppert’s book, C.S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason, is a relatively short, but philosophically rigorous book. The fundamental burden of the book is to explicate Lewis’s argument found in his Miracles, sometime called the argument from reason, and defend it against some contemporary trends in philosophy. Reppert takes an almost deceptively simple argument against naturalism and reveals it as the powerful apologetic tool that it is.
Lewis’s fundamental claim is that rational inference cannot be explained in purely naturalistic terms, and because it is obvious that rational inference does occur, that is a reason to reject naturalism. The title of the book is a self-confessed spin-off of Dennett’s book, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. The deliberate connection in the title juxtaposes Dennett’s contention about the fundamental realities of reasoning and Lewis’s. Dennett argued that the best way to build knowledge was through the use of “cranes” and not “skyhooks.” Cranes are ideas and theories built on previous, naturalistically achieved, theories. A skyhook is a derogatory term for theories explained in terms of the supernatural or non-natural, and which, as the title implies, have no real grounding. Lewis’s contention is that there is something fundamental about the way reason works that turns Dennett’s idea on its head.
The first obstacle Reppert works to overcome is what he calls a biographical objection. He notes that many of the objections to Lewis’s philosophy are attacks on Lewis the person and not on his ideas. As legend has it, this argument of Lewis’s was once attacked and (apparently) trounced at a meeting by Elizabeth Anscombe. As the legend goes, Lewis basically gave up his apologetic writings after this apparent embarrassment. But as Reppert details, Lewis not only replied to Anscombe’s objections in an updated version of Miracles, Anscombe openly admitted that the second version was much more rigorous and harder to critique.
This section of the book was helpful to me in that I think many people’s objection to Lewis as a serious philosopher are biographical and not technical. His reputation as a favorite of evangelicals and as the author of children’s books has colored the view of many. In all honesty, I don’t see the need for the seeming bifurcation between serious thinker, religious thinker, and popular author. I think we need more serious and rigorous thinkers, not less, writing popular books than we might have now.
After a helpful chapter on apologetic arguments in which Reppert classifies Lewis as a “critical rationalist,” the philosophical defense begins in ernest. The first objections he deals with are the original objections posited by Anscombe. She critiqued Lewis’s original formulation by arguing that non-rational reasons may give rise to rational inference (Lewis originally used the term “irrational”), and that paradigm cases of reasoning may serve as an example of good and bad rational inference. Later in the book, Reppert continues to defend the argument from reason against more contemporary objectors. He deals with critiques concerning the explanatory power of non-physical causes, and what he calls the inadequacy objection.
Essentially, the inadequacy objection is that when naturalistic/materialistic reasons are found for any explanatory gap, they are the best and most sufficient explanations for phenomena. So, non-physical explanations, by their very nature, fall short. This chapter, along with its specific intent, provides a solid philosophical look into an answer to the “god-of-the-gaps” objection to theism.
Theism, and all the science and philosophy surrounding it, is often rejected as a point of view that will naturally be discarded when a better, materialistic, explanation is discovered. So is the case in this book with rational inference. Lewis and Reppert argue that it cannot be explained by naturalism, and thus is a reason to reject it. Naturalists reply that the non-natural explanation is a stopgap measure that will simply fade away when science has caught up with itself: we used to explain thunder as God doing something or other in the heavens, and now we know differently. It is, so the argument goes, the same with rational inference.
But Reppert’s point is that the argument from reason is no “god-of-the-gaps” argument. Instead of being an argument simply from an ignorance of natural explanation, it is a positive argument about the only good philosophical explanation for rational inference. In other words, if the argument from reason holds, there is logically no naturalistic explanation for the exercise of reason.
This same point can be made in the case of Intelligent Design, and recent work in the area of testable models of nature that infer (or abduct, if “abduct” is a verb) the existence of an intelligence. The straw man argument against ID is the claim that it is a “god-of-the-gaps” point of view that will disappear with the next scientific advancement. But that misses the point entirely. The point is the same as Reppert’s-if the argument holds, naturalism will never explain our origins or our apparent design.
I would highly recommend this book with one simple caveat: be prepared to think. It was a more philosophically rigorous book than I expected. I refuse to call this caveat a warning: it is a challenge and an encouragement to think a bit more deeply about Lewis, about apologetics, and about how your mental faculties work.
Lewis’s fundamental claim is that rational inference cannot be explained in purely naturalistic terms, and because it is obvious that rational inference does occur, that is a reason to reject naturalism. The title of the book is a self-confessed spin-off of Dennett’s book, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. The deliberate connection in the title juxtaposes Dennett’s contention about the fundamental realities of reasoning and Lewis’s. Dennett argued that the best way to build knowledge was through the use of “cranes” and not “skyhooks.” Cranes are ideas and theories built on previous, naturalistically achieved, theories. A skyhook is a derogatory term for theories explained in terms of the supernatural or non-natural, and which, as the title implies, have no real grounding. Lewis’s contention is that there is something fundamental about the way reason works that turns Dennett’s idea on its head.
The first obstacle Reppert works to overcome is what he calls a biographical objection. He notes that many of the objections to Lewis’s philosophy are attacks on Lewis the person and not on his ideas. As legend has it, this argument of Lewis’s was once attacked and (apparently) trounced at a meeting by Elizabeth Anscombe. As the legend goes, Lewis basically gave up his apologetic writings after this apparent embarrassment. But as Reppert details, Lewis not only replied to Anscombe’s objections in an updated version of Miracles, Anscombe openly admitted that the second version was much more rigorous and harder to critique.
This section of the book was helpful to me in that I think many people’s objection to Lewis as a serious philosopher are biographical and not technical. His reputation as a favorite of evangelicals and as the author of children’s books has colored the view of many. In all honesty, I don’t see the need for the seeming bifurcation between serious thinker, religious thinker, and popular author. I think we need more serious and rigorous thinkers, not less, writing popular books than we might have now.
After a helpful chapter on apologetic arguments in which Reppert classifies Lewis as a “critical rationalist,” the philosophical defense begins in ernest. The first objections he deals with are the original objections posited by Anscombe. She critiqued Lewis’s original formulation by arguing that non-rational reasons may give rise to rational inference (Lewis originally used the term “irrational”), and that paradigm cases of reasoning may serve as an example of good and bad rational inference. Later in the book, Reppert continues to defend the argument from reason against more contemporary objectors. He deals with critiques concerning the explanatory power of non-physical causes, and what he calls the inadequacy objection.
Essentially, the inadequacy objection is that when naturalistic/materialistic reasons are found for any explanatory gap, they are the best and most sufficient explanations for phenomena. So, non-physical explanations, by their very nature, fall short. This chapter, along with its specific intent, provides a solid philosophical look into an answer to the “god-of-the-gaps” objection to theism.
Theism, and all the science and philosophy surrounding it, is often rejected as a point of view that will naturally be discarded when a better, materialistic, explanation is discovered. So is the case in this book with rational inference. Lewis and Reppert argue that it cannot be explained by naturalism, and thus is a reason to reject it. Naturalists reply that the non-natural explanation is a stopgap measure that will simply fade away when science has caught up with itself: we used to explain thunder as God doing something or other in the heavens, and now we know differently. It is, so the argument goes, the same with rational inference.
But Reppert’s point is that the argument from reason is no “god-of-the-gaps” argument. Instead of being an argument simply from an ignorance of natural explanation, it is a positive argument about the only good philosophical explanation for rational inference. In other words, if the argument from reason holds, there is logically no naturalistic explanation for the exercise of reason.
This same point can be made in the case of Intelligent Design, and recent work in the area of testable models of nature that infer (or abduct, if “abduct” is a verb) the existence of an intelligence. The straw man argument against ID is the claim that it is a “god-of-the-gaps” point of view that will disappear with the next scientific advancement. But that misses the point entirely. The point is the same as Reppert’s-if the argument holds, naturalism will never explain our origins or our apparent design.
I would highly recommend this book with one simple caveat: be prepared to think. It was a more philosophically rigorous book than I expected. I refuse to call this caveat a warning: it is a challenge and an encouragement to think a bit more deeply about Lewis, about apologetics, and about how your mental faculties work.
Saturday, December 10, 2005
Intelligent Design and the Role of Explanation
This is a wonderful example of apologetic interaction with the culture at large. It is an opinion piece written by Douglas Groothuis regarding the typical take on Intelligent Design in the Denver paper, The Rocky Mountain News. HT: World Mag Blog
One excerpt:
When Darwinists refuse to admit intelligent cause as a possible explanation for specified complexity, this only reveals that they define science such that intelligent causes are disallowed in principle. But this approach is not a discovery of science itself. It is rather a philosophical commitment to materialism (the belief that reality is reducible to impersonal physical laws).
This passage addresses one of the more crucial issues raised in opposition to ID. Often ID’s opponents will regard an explanation that goes beyond the natural/physical realm as no explanation at all. In other words, good explanations describe an event or process (or whatever) by other physical events, objects, processes, etc. Any attempt to produce an effective explanation outside the physical realm is an effort in futility. Non-natural explanations are not explanations at all. (See Victor Reppert’s book, C.S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea for a developed engagement with this physicalist view of explanation.)
This view, though, reveals more about the typical assumptions built into the edifice of modern science than it does about the nature of explanation. If we begin with the assumption that physical causes are all that exist, then any attempt to explain data without appealing to other physical data will be dismissed out of hand. But, as Reppert points out in his philosophically rigorous book, exclusively physical explanations fall apart rather quickly.
If a naturalistic scientist is a fan of the N.Y Jets, his potential glee at them drafting a good quarterback next season is not at all explained by physical facts. Intent, belief, and other non-physical realities do a better job of explaining an emotion or reaction like glee than other, “lower down the chain,” physical explanations. Glee is not adequately described as having a causal chain beginning with neurons.
Analogously, for the scientific community to deny non-physical explanations for apparent design, is for them to say more about their philosophical presuppositions than their scientific rigor. And, as Dr. Groothuis points out in his article, it ends up being a straw man argument anyway.
One excerpt:
When Darwinists refuse to admit intelligent cause as a possible explanation for specified complexity, this only reveals that they define science such that intelligent causes are disallowed in principle. But this approach is not a discovery of science itself. It is rather a philosophical commitment to materialism (the belief that reality is reducible to impersonal physical laws).
This passage addresses one of the more crucial issues raised in opposition to ID. Often ID’s opponents will regard an explanation that goes beyond the natural/physical realm as no explanation at all. In other words, good explanations describe an event or process (or whatever) by other physical events, objects, processes, etc. Any attempt to produce an effective explanation outside the physical realm is an effort in futility. Non-natural explanations are not explanations at all. (See Victor Reppert’s book, C.S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea for a developed engagement with this physicalist view of explanation.)
This view, though, reveals more about the typical assumptions built into the edifice of modern science than it does about the nature of explanation. If we begin with the assumption that physical causes are all that exist, then any attempt to explain data without appealing to other physical data will be dismissed out of hand. But, as Reppert points out in his philosophically rigorous book, exclusively physical explanations fall apart rather quickly.
If a naturalistic scientist is a fan of the N.Y Jets, his potential glee at them drafting a good quarterback next season is not at all explained by physical facts. Intent, belief, and other non-physical realities do a better job of explaining an emotion or reaction like glee than other, “lower down the chain,” physical explanations. Glee is not adequately described as having a causal chain beginning with neurons.
Analogously, for the scientific community to deny non-physical explanations for apparent design, is for them to say more about their philosophical presuppositions than their scientific rigor. And, as Dr. Groothuis points out in his article, it ends up being a straw man argument anyway.
Friday, December 09, 2005
Links Sans Context 12.9.05
Chad has some very thoughtful things to say in reply to Plantinga’s “Advice to Christian Philosophers.” It is a new blog to me and looks good.
Adrian is talking about Charismatic gifts and cessationism. He links to what looks to be a thoughtful article on the contemporary issue of prophecy.
Another new blog to me by Doug Wilson-this post deals well with McLaren’s A Generous Orthodxy.
Dr. Steve Cowan is writing a short series of posts on the role of apologetics and philosophy in the church. This post in particular is about their roles from behind the pulpit.
Darrell at Disert Paths is writing a series on Christian mysticism. This post has some good thoughts on the roles of small groups and Christian communities in directing mystical experience. We are beginning a conversation on the post-throw your hat in the ring. HT: Out In The Sticks
Steve has written another in his string on evangelical theology. Check out his thoughts on why evangelicalism might be so short on tools dealing with suffering.
Adrian is talking about Charismatic gifts and cessationism. He links to what looks to be a thoughtful article on the contemporary issue of prophecy.
Another new blog to me by Doug Wilson-this post deals well with McLaren’s A Generous Orthodxy.
Dr. Steve Cowan is writing a short series of posts on the role of apologetics and philosophy in the church. This post in particular is about their roles from behind the pulpit.
Darrell at Disert Paths is writing a series on Christian mysticism. This post has some good thoughts on the roles of small groups and Christian communities in directing mystical experience. We are beginning a conversation on the post-throw your hat in the ring. HT: Out In The Sticks
Steve has written another in his string on evangelical theology. Check out his thoughts on why evangelicalism might be so short on tools dealing with suffering.
Tuesday, December 06, 2005
Pastors and Plagiarism II
Rich at BlogRodent recently posed some thoughts on my post on pastors and plagiarism. I was forming this response when it became too ginormous for a comment. So here is the latest post on pastors and the problem(?) of plagiarism.
BTW-Rich is a former Chi Alpha minister-so am I. It is good to hear from another AGer and especially from someone who was part of one of the most dynamic and quality ministries in the AG!
Rich-
Thanks for your thoughts-they have been provocative and a great help for me in thinking through this issue. In fact, I have a few things to throw out there in reply.
Intent
I agree with you that because there is only so much Scripture and it is preached over so often, we are unlikely to “come up with anything new.” In fact, one of our tasks is to be dedicated to theological unoriginality. So, if I may not say anything genuinely original this weekend, what guidelines should I use to avoid plagiarism?
To begin with, I can’t be held responsible for citing someone I have not read. I may be responsible for reading the important scholars and pastors, but you cannot be culpable for something out of your control. I have never really read Tertullian, and am likely not to.
Intent is, I think, a big deal. My friend profited off of me when he could have called me and put me in touch with the editor. His motive was profit, and therefore wrong. If I borrow from the “masters” with the intent of sounding like a master without giving credit, I believe that intent makes it wrong.
More commonly, I think pastors borrow from other popular ministers because it cuts down on their prep time. In my opinion, that is a wrong intent. The primary job of the pastor is shepherd manifest most directly by theological and biblical leadership behind the pulpit. If I get another pastor to do that for me, that intent has made my action wrong.
If a pastor does their homework in study and prayer, and utilizes tools or skills from another, then there may not be plagiarism. As an example, I do not publicly credit my seminary teachers on a regular basis for the tools they gave me, or for pointing me in certain directions. (I do, however, credit them if I repeat something they said specifically or tended to say a lot-ut back to my point.) If I learn something in class about how the Greek language works or how a theological argument works, then I do not need to credit the tools I have been given. And most of the text in a commentary may fall into that general category. They are written to bring the pastor and student up to date on the latest take on the original languages. (But even then, if I borrow a specific or poignant thought from an exegetical commentary, I will cite it.) But if I read a book in preparation for a sermon and borrow an actual point made about an issue or a passage, I am bound to credit that person.
I just don’t think a pastor can or should gloss over plagiarism by appealing to the “it has already been done a million times” defense (not that you did that).
Spiritually Specific
I believe that we can hear or read points from another minister and use them to great effect in our congregations and their specific situation. But, it is negligent of a pastor to simply “use” another pastor’s material and hope it has the same effect for them it had for the original pastor and church. How many copy-cat churches have simply repeated Warren’s or Hybel’s sermon series because their churches got big using those sermons, and hopefully theirs will too?
Even if a pastor allows their sermons to be used as a kind of public domain, does that exempt the next pastor from the moral and spiritual requirement of connecting their passage, their God and their congregation on the weekend?
Academic Expectations vs. Pastoral Expectations
I can imagine some disagreeing with me by arguing that what is expected of a scholar writing an article is different from what might be expected from a pastor behind a pulpit. Though I would grant a few differences-there may not be the same expectation of universal familiarity with the average pastor-I think the principle still applies.
For example, a scholar who submits a paper for review will have it rejected if she cites a major figure or argument in the field and does not properly cite it. Likewise, if a minister manages to convince her congregation that she came up with the doctrine of the atonement, she has committed a serious sin.
Additionally, if we expect our scholars and “masters” to be rigorous, why should we expect our ministers to be sloppy?
Congregational Expectation
What is assumed by a congregation when they listen to their weekly sermon when it comes to plagiarism and citation? I do not mean to talk about what they actually expect-that is a statistical question-I mean what kinds of expectations are they due? Should they expect the sermon they are hearing to be a carbon copy of the latest and greatest sermonizer and his series from six weeks ago? Should they expect a sermon that is taken largely from another pastor’s sermon spoken at a conference last month? Should they expect their pastor to be producing largely “original” material taken from commentaries, books, conversations, current affairs, tools and skills learned in seminary, and their own spiritual lives?
Maybe I have stacked the questions a bit, but I think the answer is fairly clear.
BTW-Rich is a former Chi Alpha minister-so am I. It is good to hear from another AGer and especially from someone who was part of one of the most dynamic and quality ministries in the AG!
Rich-
Thanks for your thoughts-they have been provocative and a great help for me in thinking through this issue. In fact, I have a few things to throw out there in reply.
Intent
I agree with you that because there is only so much Scripture and it is preached over so often, we are unlikely to “come up with anything new.” In fact, one of our tasks is to be dedicated to theological unoriginality. So, if I may not say anything genuinely original this weekend, what guidelines should I use to avoid plagiarism?
To begin with, I can’t be held responsible for citing someone I have not read. I may be responsible for reading the important scholars and pastors, but you cannot be culpable for something out of your control. I have never really read Tertullian, and am likely not to.
Intent is, I think, a big deal. My friend profited off of me when he could have called me and put me in touch with the editor. His motive was profit, and therefore wrong. If I borrow from the “masters” with the intent of sounding like a master without giving credit, I believe that intent makes it wrong.
More commonly, I think pastors borrow from other popular ministers because it cuts down on their prep time. In my opinion, that is a wrong intent. The primary job of the pastor is shepherd manifest most directly by theological and biblical leadership behind the pulpit. If I get another pastor to do that for me, that intent has made my action wrong.
If a pastor does their homework in study and prayer, and utilizes tools or skills from another, then there may not be plagiarism. As an example, I do not publicly credit my seminary teachers on a regular basis for the tools they gave me, or for pointing me in certain directions. (I do, however, credit them if I repeat something they said specifically or tended to say a lot-ut back to my point.) If I learn something in class about how the Greek language works or how a theological argument works, then I do not need to credit the tools I have been given. And most of the text in a commentary may fall into that general category. They are written to bring the pastor and student up to date on the latest take on the original languages. (But even then, if I borrow a specific or poignant thought from an exegetical commentary, I will cite it.) But if I read a book in preparation for a sermon and borrow an actual point made about an issue or a passage, I am bound to credit that person.
I just don’t think a pastor can or should gloss over plagiarism by appealing to the “it has already been done a million times” defense (not that you did that).
Spiritually Specific
I believe that we can hear or read points from another minister and use them to great effect in our congregations and their specific situation. But, it is negligent of a pastor to simply “use” another pastor’s material and hope it has the same effect for them it had for the original pastor and church. How many copy-cat churches have simply repeated Warren’s or Hybel’s sermon series because their churches got big using those sermons, and hopefully theirs will too?
Even if a pastor allows their sermons to be used as a kind of public domain, does that exempt the next pastor from the moral and spiritual requirement of connecting their passage, their God and their congregation on the weekend?
Academic Expectations vs. Pastoral Expectations
I can imagine some disagreeing with me by arguing that what is expected of a scholar writing an article is different from what might be expected from a pastor behind a pulpit. Though I would grant a few differences-there may not be the same expectation of universal familiarity with the average pastor-I think the principle still applies.
For example, a scholar who submits a paper for review will have it rejected if she cites a major figure or argument in the field and does not properly cite it. Likewise, if a minister manages to convince her congregation that she came up with the doctrine of the atonement, she has committed a serious sin.
Additionally, if we expect our scholars and “masters” to be rigorous, why should we expect our ministers to be sloppy?
Congregational Expectation
What is assumed by a congregation when they listen to their weekly sermon when it comes to plagiarism and citation? I do not mean to talk about what they actually expect-that is a statistical question-I mean what kinds of expectations are they due? Should they expect the sermon they are hearing to be a carbon copy of the latest and greatest sermonizer and his series from six weeks ago? Should they expect a sermon that is taken largely from another pastor’s sermon spoken at a conference last month? Should they expect their pastor to be producing largely “original” material taken from commentaries, books, conversations, current affairs, tools and skills learned in seminary, and their own spiritual lives?
Maybe I have stacked the questions a bit, but I think the answer is fairly clear.
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